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 1 
Abstract 
 
The effective income tax function is useful and practical methodology to analyze 
the relationship between income and tax amounts. It includes the measures of tax 
progressivity, the maximum effective tax rate, and horizontal inequity. We statistically 
estimated the effective income tax function using the seven countries out of LIS 
datasets and Korean data. We also estimated the R-S index and the Kakwani index so as 
to test the consistency among these indexes.  
Our empirical results give us several implications.  Four different indexes of tax 
progressivity reflect different aspects about the progressivity, implying that it requires 
policy planners to evaluate the income tax system with alternatives. The estimated 
maximum effective tax rate is usually less than or ve ry close to its maximum statutory 
marginal tax rate, except for Norway and Korea. It implies that the estimation of the 
effective tax function is of great use and significance to evaluate the charateristics of the 
income tax law. The mean squared error from the effective income tax function can be 
used to represent the degree of the horizontal inequity as a ‘quick’ measure.  
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I. Introduction  
 
Most countries have the progressive income tax system. Policy planners have been 
interested in examining the degree of the progressivity for the evaluation of the income 
tax system. In fact, many progressivity indexes have been suggested, however, these 
measures reflect different aspects about tax progressivity. Also, there are many ways to 
evaluate the income tax, for example, nominal tax rate, marginal effective tax rate, 
along with the amount and its upper limit by types of deductions, tax credits and income 
brackets specified in the laws.  
Kiefer (1984) categorized the indexes of tax progressivity into two types, which are 
structural index and distributional index. The former is the index using a function of the 
relationship between the amount of income and the taxes imposed on it (the tax 
structure), while the latter measures a function of the tax structure and of the income 
distribution. Duclos and Tabi (1996) also divided the indexes of tax progressivity into 
two types which are a tax share view and a redistributive approach. They suggested that 
the Kakwani index and the Suits index belong to the tax share view and the 
redistributive approach can be applicable to the Musgrave and Thin, the Pechman –
Okner index, and the Reynolds-Smolensky index. In addition to these categories, there 
are a lot of progressivity indexes, for example, Baum (1987, 1998), Aggarwal(1994), 
and etc. 
Berliant and Gouveia (1993), Gouveia and Strauss (1999, 1994) developed an 
effective tax function to measuring the relationship between income and tax amounts by 
specific functional forms.  This approach is conceptually simple and practical to apply, 
and also explains lots of characteristics about income tax system. 
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An effective income tax function includes several parameters, which are related to  
two indexes of progressivity. This function also can be used to show the difference in 
income tax systems. The effective income tax function has the several attributes.  First, 
a maximum effective tax rate represents not only the incentive effect of the income tax 
on the labor supply, but also politically maximum feasible tax rate (Gouveia and Strauss, 
1994). Second, the mean squared error (MSE) from the estimated function can be used 
as a ‘quick’ index based on the classical concept of  horizontal inequity, which is 
unequal treatment of equals. Finally, both the elasticity of after-tax income with respect 
to economic income and the residual income elasticity as a tax progressivity can also be 
easily calculated.  
The income tax system for each country has different aspects in tax rate, income 
bracket, income deduction, tax credit, etc.  Thus it is very difficult to compare the 
income tax systems among different countries.  The effective income tax function might 
give us one practical approach to compare the income tax systems among different 
countries. 
The purpose of this study is to statistically estimate the effective income tax 
function for comparative analysis of income tax systems. We apply the effective income 
tax function to selective countries from Luxemboug Income Study (hereafter LIS) 
dataset and Korean Household Expenditure Survey Data. We show a degree of 
incentive effects of income taxes on the labor supply, the index of horizontal inequity, 
and two kinds of tax progressivity indexes. We also estimate the Reynolds -Smolensky 
index (hereafter, R-S index) and the Kakwani index to evaluate any difference of 
empirical results between the effective income tax function and popularly applied tax 
progressivity indexes.  
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This paper consists with four sections. Section 2 discusses the effective income tax 
function to be estimated, and its implications. Section 3 presents the empirical results 
for eight countries. Finally, Section 4 is summarized and concluded.  
 
II. The Effective Income Tax Function 
 
We discuss the derivation and characteristics of the effective income tax function. 
This function was originally derived from the equal sacrifice theory by Young (1988, 
1990) and more generally by Berlaint and Gouveia (1993).  It is also practically applied 
by Gouveia and Strauss (1999, 1994). 
Now we briefly explain how the equation was derived. Young (1990) presented the 
tax functions constructed by applying the absolute version of the equal sacrifice 
principle to the isoelastic utility function as follows: 
pu c-= -  
where u is the level of utility, c  is the level of consumption, and p is a parameter. 
The rule defines the tax function that causes a sacrifice of ‘s’ from economic income, y, 
as the solution to   
sytyy pp =-+- -- ))((  
from which we find the total tax function 
pp syyyt /1)()( -- +-= . 
We derive the average tax function as follows: 
ppyst /1)1*(1 -+-= . 
 5 
This equation has the asymptotic marginal and average tax rates of 100 percent that 
might readily affect the willingness to work. The above function does not consider 
incentive effects of the income tax on labor supply. So Berliant and Gouveia (1993) 
propose the labor supply component in this framework by integrating the notion of 
equal sacrifice on optimal income taxation. Empirical studies were done by Gouveia 
and Strauss (1999, 1994) by adding a specification with one parameter ‘b’ as an 
approximation to incentive compatible to the equal sacrifice tax function as follows:  
1/( 1)p patr b b s y e-= - * * + +          (1) 
where  
atr:  average tax rate,  
y : economic income 
b , s, p : parameters to be estimated 
e : an additive statistical disturbance 
 
We use equation (1) for the estimation of the effective income tax function. Now 
we discuss the economic implications of parameter estimates from the effective income 
tax function.1 First, the estimate of ‘b’ represents a maximum effective tax rate, which 
is interpreted as a weight given to incentives in the design of the effective income tax 
function. The parameter ‘b’ was interpreted as a maximum politically feasible tax rate 
(Gouveia and Strauss, 1994, p. 335). Also Gouveia and Strauss (1999) noted that a 
lower b represents more incentives to the willingness to work. So we display which 
countries have more incentive on labor supply of taxes with these values.  
                                                             
1 The expression p+1 is the constant relative risk aversion coefficient and 1/(p+1) is the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution assuming preferences take the form of additive utility functions (Gouveia and 
Strauss, 1999, p. 155). However, we don ’t deal with parameter ‘p’ in our study. 
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Second, the estimated mean squared error (MSE) from the effective income tax 
function can be used as a ‘quick’ index of the classical horizontal inequity. The classical 
notion of horizontal inequity means unequal treatment of equals. Even if there have 
been many indexes to measure the horizontal inequity  (see Kaplow, 1989, Aronson et 
al., 1994), MSE, which is a by-product of the effective tax function estimation, can be 
used as another measure to represent the horizontal inequity.  
Third, the elasticity of after-tax income with respect to economic income evaluated 
at a given point, which is called as residual income elasticity, may be a local measure of 
distributional effects of the income tax (Jakobssen, 1976). But, we follow Pfingsten 
(1986), who proposed the average of individually calculated residual income elasticities 
as a global measure. We estimate the mean of a global measure proposed by Pfingsten 
(1986) as the residual income elasticity using the estimates of the effective income tax 
function like Gouveia and Strauss (1994) as follows: 
å
-
-×=×
=
N
i i
i
yt
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y
dy
dx
1
'
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, 
where )(' iyt is a marginal tax rate for individual i, )( iyt  is an average tax rate for 
individual i, and N is the number of taxpayers.  The elasticity which has smaller than 
one represents a progressive tax system. The lower the elasticity is, the larger the 
equalizing effects on the income distribution is.  
Fourth, we measure the elasticity of the tax revenue with respect to income. We use 
the aggregate of the elasticity, which is a weighted average of the individual elasticities 
where weights are tax payments. Its expression is as follows: 
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where 
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E ×= ,  R is the tax revenue, and 
R
yt i )(  is weights. Its value is 
greater than one for the progressive tax system. This elasticity can be easily computed 
with estimates of the effective tax function.  
The economic income is used as all sources of taxable income.2 We define the 
economic income as total gross income minus non-taxable income like means -tested 
cash benefits. Let us give an example of non-taxable income with Belgium. There are 
noncash property income, family or child allowances, social assistance, old age 
assitance, other means -tested allowances, near cash housing benefits, near cash 
education benefits, and so on.  The average tax rate is calculated by dividing income 
taxes by economic income. The income variables of LIS datasets are shown in 
Appendix. 
 
III. Empirical Results 
 
We applied our model to seven countries from the LIS dataset for practical 
adaptibility and Korean micro data. We got the convergent results of effective income 
tax functions from Australia (1994),  Belgium (1992, 1997), and the Canada (1991, 
1997, 1998), Germany (1994), Israel (1992, 1997), Norway (1991, 1995), USA (1991, 
1994, 1997, 2000). However, we select one specific year for each country to discuss the 
difference in income tax systems. Table 1 shows our empirical estimates for eight 
countries including Korea (1996).  
                                                             
2 Taxable incomes used for the estimation in each country can be found in the lissification tables of LIS 
homepage.  
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Table 1:  Empirical Results from the Effective Tax Functions  
Country 
Sample 
Size 
b 
(%) 
Max. 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
P S RIE RE1 ERI MSE 
Australia 
(1994) 
4624 
38.0 
(0.0093) 
47.0  
1.925 
(0.0681) 
7.50E-09 
(0.000) 
0.8470 0.153 1.5660 0.00213 
Belgium 
(1997) 
3710 
40.0 
(0.0085) 
55.0  
3.489 
(0.1279) 
1.45E-20 
(0.000) 
0.8047 0.195 1.6524 0.00241 
Canada 
(1998) 
25611 
34.3 
(0.0043) 
49.0  
1.915 
(0.0348) 
6.53E-09 
(0.000) 
0.8668 0.133 1.5512 0.00289 
Germany 
(1994) 
4382 
53.2 
(0.0248) 
53.0  
1.348 
(0.0363) 
2.29E-07 
(0.000) 
0.8648 0.135 1.8287 0.00141 
Israel 
(1997) 
3464 
50.9 
(0.0244) 
50.0  
1.492 
(0.0535) 
2.96E-08 
(0.000) 
0.8587 0.141 1.7580 0.00305 
Norway 
(1995) 
9035 
38.9 
(0.0145) 
28.0  
1.204 
(0.0420) 
3.92E-07 
(0.000) 
0.8769 0.123 1.5500 0.00186 
USA 
(1997) 
39508 
37.6 
(0.00364) 
39.6  
1.367 
(0.0125) 
5.51E-07 
(0.000) 
0.8944 0.106 1.5938 0.00172 
Korea 
(1996) 
24290 
47.6 
(0.0274) 
40.0  
1.203 
(0.0222) 
7.85E-07 
(0.000) 
0.9484 0.115 1.9295 0.00197 
(Note) 1. RIE: Residual Income Elasticity,  
ERI: Elasticity of Tax Revenue with respect to pre-tax Income,  
RE1 = 1- RIE. 
2. The maximum marginal tax rate of Canada adds the federal rate to the  
provincial/territorial taxes. Norway has the flat tax rate of 28%. 
3. Standard error in parentheses.  
 
We interpret our estimates of tax progressivities and various properties about the 
income tax systems for each country. First, the residual income elasticity (hereafter 
RIE) and the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to pre-tax income (hereafter ERI) 
show considerable variations in the countries for study (see also Figure 1). Ranking the 
countries in descending order with RIE, Belgium is followed by Australia, Israel, 
Germany, Canada, Norway, Korea, and USA. Also, ranking the countries in the same 
way as the above indexes for ERI, Korea is followed by Germany, Israel, Belgium, 
USA, Australia, Canada, and Norway.  
Second, there are country-specific fluctuations of a maximum effective tax rate in 
all the countries.  
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Figure 1:  Maximum Effective or Marginal Tax Rate 
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As we explained, the lower b indicates the more incentive. In this context, Canada 
has the least disincentive effect on work in income tax system, which means that 
Canadian income tax system has a relatively small influence on the labor supply, even 
if the maximum marginal tax rate is not low relative to other countries. By the same 
token, Germany has the most disincentive on the willingness to work. The intersting 
finding is that the estimated maximum effective tax rate is less than or very similar to 
its maximum marginal tax rate except for Norway and Korea. In the cases of Israel and 
Germany, the maximum effective tax rates are almost the same as the maximum 
statutory marginal tax rates.  
Third, from RE1 in Table 1 to represent the redistributive effect of income tax 
system, Belgium is followed by Australia, Israel, Germany, Canada, Norway, Korea, 
and USA. Belgium has the most redistributive effect of income tax system, while Korea 
and USA have the least redistributive effect. In general, the tax progressivity can be 
interpreted as the vertical effect, so we choose a measure of vertical effect as the 
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elasticity of tax revenue with respect to pre-tax income to find the implications with the 
horizontal inequity. 
Fourth, for the ‘quick’ index of horizontal inequity which is a by-product from the 
effective income tax function, Israel is followed by Canada, Belgium, Australia, Korea, 
Norway, USA, and Germany (see Figure 2). This index shows that the income tax 
system violates the horizontal equity due to deductions, tax credits, and other items. 
Comparing horizontal inequity with vertical inequity, Germany has a high effect of  
vertical equity and a low horizontal inequity. Korea, which has the highest vertical 
effect, shows a medium level of the horizontal inequity. Israel, whose horizontal 
inequity is the highest, demonstrates the third ranking in the vertical effect. There seems 
to be no correlation between the vertical and horizontal effects. This comparison 
implies that the evaluation of the income tax systems requires us to consider both the 
vertical and horizontal equity. However, it nee ds more analysis to support this assertion, 
as the MSE is a ‘quick’ index unlike the other horizontal inequity index.  
In this context, it can be said that the estimates of the effective income tax function 
are of great use in evaluating the income tax systems for different countries.  
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Figure 2:  Horizontal Inequity Index 
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Now we calculate the measures of the R-S index and the Kakwani index so as to 
supplement the progressivity values of the effective income tax function. The 
comparison of these indexes checks to see if each index tells the different stories about 
the progressivity from the same dataset. The R-S index as a tax progressivity index is 
calculated by subtracting the post-tax Gini coefficient from the pre-tax one, while the 
Kakwani index is measured as a concentration index for the income tax minus the 
pretax Gini coefficient. The RE2 is the percentage change in the Gini coefficients of 
pre- and post-tax income.  
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Table 2: Income Inequality and Other Progressivity Indexes  
Country Gini Coefficients Progressivity 
RE2 
(%) 
 
Pretax Post tax 
Concentration 
Index for tax 
R-S index Kakwani index  
Australia 
(1994) 
0.281 0.242 0.444 0.038 0.163 13.6 
Belgium 
(1997) 
0.266 0.216 0.465 0.050 0.199 18.9 
Canada 
(1998) 
0.291 0.257 0.463 0.034 0.172 11.6 
Germany 
(1994) 
0.266 0.221 0.471 0.045 0.205 17.1 
Israel 
(1997) 
0.335 0.294 0.588 0.041 0.253 12.2 
Norway 
(1995) 
0.235 0.209 0.384 0.027 0.148 11.5 
USA 
(1997) 
0.369 0.339 0.561 0.030 0.192 8.2 
Korea 
(1996) 
0.370 0.353 0.736 0.017 0.366 4.6 
Note: RE2 = R -S index/pre-tax Gini coefficient *100 
 
Figure 3:  Comparison of Tax Progressivities Indexes 
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We get several interesting results from these comparisons. First, the international 
comparison of the conventional inequality indexes shows that there are relatively much 
differences in the degrees of pre-tax and post-tax income inequality. However, these 
differences are relatively higher in Korea and USA than in other countries. We also find 
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that the trend of differences between the pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients 
corresponds to that of the R-S index.  
Second, ranking countries in descending order of progressivity using the R-S index, 
Belgium is followed by Germany, and USA. Ranking the country-specific e lasticities of 
tax revenue with respect to income, Korea is followed by Germany, Israel, Belgium, 
USA, Australia, Canada, and Norway. These results definitely illustrate that each index 
tells different stories about the progressivity from the same dataset (see Figure 3). 
Besides, empirical results about tax progressivity clearly indicate slight difference 
across countries in the degree of four indexes about tax progressivities.  
Third, comparing the RE1 with the RE2 as a measure of the redistributive effect, 
the two values appear to display a relatively different trend as can be seen in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4:  Comparison of Redistributive Effects 
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The findings from these comparisons justify the necessity for policy planners to use 
several alternatives of a tax progressivity index together in order to correctly evaluate 
the income tax system. The effective income tax function has various advantages. Our 
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empirical results illustrate that it is reasonable to consider several measures to properly 
evaluate the income tax system.  
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
We statistically estimated the effective income tax function using the seven 
countries dataset from LIS and Korea data, to measure the tax progressivity, the 
maximum effective tax rate, and the horizontal inequity. We also estimated the R-S 
index and the Kakwani index so as to supplement the evaluation of the income tax 
system with the index values from the effective income tax function.  
Our empirical results give us several implications. Each index in four types of tax 
progressivity tells the different stories about the progressivity as expected, implying that 
it requires policy planners to evaluate the income tax system with alternatives. The 
estimates of maximum effective tax rate are usually less than or very close to its 
maximum statutory marginal tax rate, except for Norway and Korea. It implies that the 
estimation of the effective income tax function is of great use and significance to 
evaluate the charateristics of the income tax system. The MSE, which is a by-product 
from the estimate of the effective income tax function,  represents the degree of the 
horizontal inequity as a ‘quick’ measure.  
In conclusion, the effective income tax function can be said to be a useful and 
appropriate criterion to evaluate the charateristics of the income tax system, despite 
some differences in the degree of the tax progressivity and redistributive effect from 
existing indexes.  
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Appendix: LIS Summary Income Variables  
 Variable Definition Variable Name 
+ Gross wages and salaries V1  
+ Farm self-employment income V4 
+ Non-farm self-employment income V5 
=SELFI  
= Total Earnings EARNING 
+ Cash property income V8  
= Factor Income FI 
+ Private pensions V32 
+ Public sector pensions V33 
=PENSIONI 
= Market Income MI 
+ Social retirement benefits V19  
+ Child or family allowances V20  
+ Unemployment compensation V21  
+ Sick pay V16 
+ Accident pays V17 
+ Disability pay V18 
+ Maternity pay V22 
+ Military/vet/war benefits V23 
+ Other social insurance V24 
=OTHSOCI 
=SOCI 
+ Means-teste cash benefits V25 
+ Near-cash benefits V26 
=MEANSI  
S 
O 
C 
T 
R 
A 
N 
S 
+ Alimony or Child Support  V34 
+ Other regular private income V35 
=PRIVATI 
 
 
T 
R 
A 
N 
S 
I 
+ Other cash income V36  
= Total Gross Income GI 
- Mandatory contributions for self-
employed 
V7 
- Mandatory employee contribution V13 
=PAYROLL 
- Income tax V11  
= Disposable Income DPI 
                     Note: www.lisproject.org  
 
 
 
 
